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Minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements constitute 
hard-core vertical restraints and are treated as object restrictions 
in EU competition law. This article suggests that the time may 
have come where this approach is revised. After, first, discussing 
the economic theory behind RPM and the EU Court’s approach 
to object restrictions, it argues that the recent widening of the 
object analysis and the concomitant blurring of the object and 
effect categories may aid EU competition law to reconceptualise 
the approach to minimum RPM.  
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A. Introduction  
This article proposes that a new evaluation of minimum resale price 
maintenance (RPM) may now be possible under EU competition law. In the 
light of recent EU Court of Justice (CJ) case law that has allowed for a wider 
treatment of object restrictions the time may soon come where minimum 
RPM is no longer treated as an object restriction. The article discusses the 
novel approach in Allianz Hungária 1  and argues that this can be 
constructively applied in the area of minimum RPM. It suggests that the 
analysis in Allianz Hungária could be a possible way forward to address 
issues raised by economic theory and would provide a superior approach in 
terms of the burden of proof. In addition, it will bring the EU competition 
law approach to minimum RPM agreements in line with the US approach 
following the seminal judgment in Leegin.2 Given the CJ’s approach in 
Allianz Hungária together with the heavier weight placed upon efficiencies 
by the Commission,3 this article opts for the formulation of a middle ground 
for the examination of minimum RPM. It further assesses whether this 
approach is preferable to the current one in the light of economic thinking 
and the need to formulate administrable legal rules. 
First, this article discusses the current approach to RPM in EU 
competition law (section 2). Given that minimum RPM is classified as an 
object restriction, section 3 examines the CJ’s approach to object 
                                                
1 Case C-32/11 Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt. and Others v Gazdasági Versenyhivatal 
[2013] 4 CMLR 25. 
2 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911); Leegin Creative 
Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
3 An indication towards a more economics approach to RPM can be deduced from the 2010 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints discussing efficiencies in the context of fixed and 
minimum RPM. See Commission (EU), ‘Guidelines on Vertical Restraints’ [2010] OJ 
C130/1 (‘Vertical Guidelines’) para 225. 
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restrictions. Section 4 explains how the analysis in Allianz Hungária differs 
from previous case law and section 5 argues that post Allianz Hungária a 
novel ‘quick effects’ analysis has been adopted by the Court that can be 
constructively applied in the area of minimum RPM (section 6).  
  
4 
 
B. Resale Price Maintenance and its treatment in EU competition law 
The treatment of RPM is hotly debated in EU competition law4 since the US 
Supreme Court in Leegin5 overturned the nearly one hundred year old Dr. 
Miles6 per se prohibition of minimum RPM. In 1911 the Supreme Court 
established that an agreement to maintain a minimum resale price between 
the drug company Dr Miles and its downstream retailers was illegal under 
the Sherman Act because it had the same effects as a horizontal price fixing 
agreement. This precedent was set aside almost a hundred years later in 
Leegin. This case concerned a minimum RPM arrangement between Leegin 
and its distributors. Leegin manufactured leather belts for women. These 
belts were priced in the middle range and had a small market share. After 
one of its retailers continued to sell below Leegin’s suggested prices, Leegin 
ceased supplies. The subsequent damages claim by PSKS reached the 
Supreme Court. Leegin had been found to have engaged in illegal price 
fixing pursuant to the Dr. Miles rule before the first instance court and at the 
appellate stage. The Supreme Court majority overturned Dr. Miles and 
highlighted in particular the economic theory on the pro-competitive effects 
of RPM.  
                                                
4 E Gippini-Fournier, ’Resale Price Maintenance in the EU: In Status Quo Ante Bellum?’ in 
B Hawk (ed) Fordham Corporate Law Institute- 36th Annual Conference on International 
Antitrust Law and Policy 2009 (Fordham 2011) 515; A Jones, ’Resale Price Maintenance: A 
Debate About Competition Policy in Europe?’ (2009) 5 European Competition Journal 479. 
C Hofmann ‘Vertical Price Fixing in Europe and the U.S. – The Way to a Uniform 
Approach for Both Markets’ (2013) 24 European Business Law Review 699; A Font-
Galarza, FP Maier-Rigaud & P Figueroa ‘PRM under EU Competition Law: Some 
Considerations from a Business and Economic Perspective’ (November 2013) (1) CPI 
Antitrust Chronicle. 
5 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co supra  n 2 
6 Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS Inc. supra  n 2. 
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Since Leegin, federal US antitrust law no longer treats minimum RPM as 
prohibited per se but assesses it under the rule of reason. Thus, pressure has 
mounted in Europe to update its approach to RPM. While the Commission 
tried to renovate its approach with the 2010 Block Exemption Regulation on 
Vertical Restraints (VBER)7 and the Vertical Guidelines,8  criticism has 
persisted. The Commission has been urged to treat minimum RPM as an 
effect and not as an object restriction.9  
The area of RPM is complex, in particular since RPM as a vertical 
phenomenon can take different forms. There are recommended prices, 
maximum resale prices, minimum resale prices and fixed resale prices. In 
general the different forms of RPM can range from harmless arrangements 
typically not within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU to more problematic 
object restrictions. When assessing the restrictive effects of the different 
forms of RPM, recommended resale prices seem to be on the one end and 
fixed resale prices on the other end of a scale with fixed resale prices being 
the most restrictive form of RPM. Minimum resale prices seem closer to 
fixed while maximum resale prices seem closer to recommended resale 
prices.  
                                                
7 Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices [2010] OJ L102/1.  
8 Vertical Guidelines supra n 3. On the approach to vertical restraints in general see S 
Simon, ‘Vertical Restraints: New BER and Guidelines Adopted’ (2010) 1 Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 311. 
9 See, for example, M Velez, ‘The Tenuous Evolution of Resale Price Maintenance’ (2011) 
32 European Competition Law Review 302; HJ Hovenkamp, ’Leegin, the Rule of Reason, 
and Vertical Agreement’ (2010) U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1673519 accessed 25 July 2015; KG 
Elzinga and DE Mills, ’The Economics of Resale Price Maintenance’ (2008) 3 Issues in 
Competition Law and Policy (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008) 1841; Gippini-Fournier 
supra n 4 515; Jones supra n 4 479. For a concise overview of the economic arguments for 
and against vertical price-fixing agreements see Hofmann supra n 4; Font-Galarza, Maier-
Rigaud & Figueroa supra n 4. 
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1. RPM that are typically harmless 
A typically harmless form of RPM is the setting of maximum retail prices. 
Maximum retail prices are in general set by the manufacturer/supplier to 
ensure that the retailer will not exceed them. Such agreements are not listed 
as hard-core restrictions under Article 4(a) VBER but are examined under 
the effects analysis. According to the Vertical Guidelines it would typically 
be difficult to find and prove any negative effect on competition.10 The 
setting of maximum retail price by the producer ensures that the retailers’ 
market power on the downstream market cannot be exercised by 
overcharging. Producer welfare and the consumer welfare are aligned 
because such overcharging would reduce the total sales volume thereby 
harming consumer and producer welfare.11  
Another form of RPM that would typically not be caught by Article 
101(1) TFEU are genuine recommended retail prices. Such prices are 
suggested by the manufacturer/supplier and should act as a guideline, but 
retailers remain free to determine the actual sale price. Advertising the 
recommended resale price can act as a benchmark against which a retailer 
can compare their price cut. Used in this way, recommended resale prices 
can increase inter- as well as intra-brand 12  competition and are thus 
                                                
10 Vertical Guidelines supra n 3 para 227. 
11 Cf R van den Bergh and PD Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A 
Comparative Perspective (Sweet Maxwell 2006) 209ff. Maximum resale prices may only 
have negative effects if the retail level is not competitive. A competitive retail level should 
ensure that prices will not be excessive since both manufacture/supplier and retailer have an 
interest in increased sales, see Communication from the Commission on the application of 
the Community competition rules to vertical restraints - Follow-up to the Green Paper on 
vertical restraints, COM(98) 544 final [1998] OJ C 365/3, 9; Font-Galarza, Maier-Rigaud & 
Figueroa supra n 4 4ff.  
12 Inter-brand competition describes the competition between different brands. Typically 
this form of competition takes place between different producers of products in the same 
market. Intra-brand competition describes the competition between different retailers which 
sell the same product/brand.  
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harmless from a competition perspective.13 In practice it may however be 
difficult to determine the dividing line between recommended retail prices as 
unilateral practices and agreements. A unilateral practice, that is to say cases 
of mere recommendations, is not caught by Article 101(1) TFEU. Yet, in a 
situation where a factual obligation exists to charge the recommended price, 
the measure is caught as agreement under Article 101(1) TFEU. Hence, the 
distinction within Article 101(1) TFEU is between genuine 
recommendations, which, as unilateral practice, remain outside its scope14 
and agreements to charge a certain price. Establishing such agreements 
means that the prices are in fact not recommended but tacitly agreed upon, so 
that Article 101(1) TFEU applies.15 Thus, when price recommendations are 
enforced against retailers who undercut these prices16 the recommended 
retail prices are in reality fixed or minimum resale prices17 and should be 
treated as such.18   
                                                
13 G Niels, H Jenkins and J Kavangh, Economics for Competition Lawyers (OUP 2011) 329. 
14 Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris v Schillgalis [1986] ECR 353 para 25. 
15 See eg Case COMP/37.975– PO/Yamaha Commission Decision of 16. June 2003 para 
124ff; Case T-41/96 Bayer v Commission [2000] ECR II-3383; on appeal Case C-2/01P and 
C-3/01 P BAI and Commission v Bayer [2004] ECR I-23; Case C-338/00 P Volkswagen v 
Commission [2003] ECR I-9189. The Courts in Volkswagen v Commission highlighted that 
a form of acceptance must be established to find that a tacit agreement on resale prices has 
been reached. It is not sufficient that the manufacture/supplier issues lists with 
recommended prices/discounts and retailers/dealers subsequently sign a dealership 
agreement. Agreements can be found in particular where, for example, the margins, the 
maximum level of discount, the conditionality of rebates or reimbursement of promotional 
costs on the observance of pricing models were agreed, or where a link is made to the resale 
prices of competitors. Moreover, warnings, intimidation and threats or penalties, delays and 
the suspension of deliveries or even contract terminations in relation to price models 
suggested by the manufacture/supplier can be used to establish a tacit agreement. See 
Vertical Guidelines supra n 3 paras 48, 226ff, See also R Whish and D Bailey, Competition 
Law (OUP 2012) 664ff.  
16 On reaction of manufactures towards disobeying retailers, R Livingston Steiner, ‘How 
Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When are Vertical Restraints 
Efficient?’ (1997) 65 Antitrust Law Journal 407; EA Elias, ‘Dealer Termination or 
Exclusion, Intrabrand Competition and GTE Sylvania’ (1977) 29 Baylor Law Review 435. 
17 Vertical Guidelines supra n 3 paras 226ff. 
18 Unfortunately, the Commission's Guidelines are not sufficiently clear in this regard. The 
Guidelines explain in detail the competitive risk of recommended prices but fail to explain 
that genuine recommended prices are not covered by Article 101 TFEU, because no 
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2. Problematic forms of RPM 
Highly problematic from a competition law perspective are fixed retail 
prices, which are considered object restrictions. 19  Fixed retail prices 
constitute hard core restraints listed in Article 4(a) VBER, even if they cover 
only a small part of the relevant market. The Vertical Guidelines explain in 
detail the competitive risks. They stress that such agreements eliminate 
intra-brand competition facilitating collusion between suppliers and between 
distributors. Distributors with strong market power may be able to force or 
convince suppliers to fix their resale price above the competitive level 
helping them to stabilise or reach a collusive equilibrium. Moreover, 
competition between manufacturers and/or between retailers is generally 
softened, particularly where manufacturers use the same distributors for their 
products and fixed retail prices agreements are employed by all or many of 
the manufacturers. The obvious negative effect of fixed retail prices is that 
distributors are prevented from lowering their sales price for that particular 
brand. This prevents efficient retailers from acquiring sufficient scale with 
low prices.20  
                                                                                                                        
agreement exists in the first place. Instead the Commission explains that the ‘possible 
competition risk of maximum and recommended prices is that they will work as a focal 
point for the resellers and might be followed by most or all of them and/or that maximum or 
recommended prices may soften competition or facilitate collusion between suppliers.’(para 
227 of the Vertical Guidelines supra n 3 ). This risk would be higher when the supplier 
holds a very strong market position, (see paras 227 and 228 of the Vertical Guidelines). The 
Commission then even seems to give the (false) impression that a recommend resale price 
will be subject to Article 101 (1) TFEU when distinguishing between maximum prices and 
recommended prices (paras 226 – 229 of the Vertical Guidelines). This is so because the 
Commissions expresses the view that maximum resale prices should be treated more 
favourably than recommended prices since maximum resale prices may help to ensure that 
the brand in question competes more forcefully with other brands, including the 
manufacturer’s own label products (see para 229 of the Guidelines). 
19 See in this regard eg Case 243/83 Binon v AMP [1985] ECR 2015 para 44. 
20 Vertical Guidelines supra n 3 para 224. 
9 
 
For the same reasons the Commission seems to classify minimum 
RPM agreements as hard-core restrictions (Article 4a VBER). 21  The 
Commission as a response to the US Leegin decision made clear in its 
Vertical Guidelines that although minimum RPM agreements are considered 
to be object restrictions they may be exempted under Article 
101 (3) TFEU.22 While this has always been true not only for minimum 
RPM agreements but for all object restrictions, the Commission for the first 
time expressly recognised the benefits that RPM may have. The Vertical 
Guidelines were therefore aimed at highlighting that the Commission would 
not adopt a per se approach addressing some of the criticism based on 
economic theory. 
The difference between the EU and the US approach is the allocation 
of the burden of proof. Subjecting minimum RPM under the rule of reason in 
the US may have the effect of establishing a per se legality.23 It is for the 
competition authority or the private claimant to establish the competitive 
harm. In contrast, in the EU the Commission or a private claimant would not 
have to establish such harm but it would be for the defendant to establish 
pro-competitive effects of the minimum RPM scheme. 
                                                
21 See also  Commission (EU), ‘Guidance on restrictions of competition "by object" for the 
purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice’ (Staff 
Working Document) (2014) 198 final (Brussels 25 June 2014) 2, 16-17. 
22 Vertical Guidelines supra n 3 paras 48, 223. 
23 See Jones, supra n 4 495ff. Although, it needs to be seen how the lower courts will apply 
Leegin in terms of the burden of proof under the rule of reason, see See Leegin Creative 
Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) p 19. 
Moreover, it needs to be taken into account that many US states have adopted legislation 
prohibiting minimum RPM schemes which may not necessarily be pre-empted by Leegin. 
See MLindsay, ’Resale Price Maintenance and the World After Leegin’ (2007) Antitrust 1,  
A MacKay and D Smith, ‘The Empirical Effects of Minimum Resale Price’ (June 16, 2014) 
Kilts Booth Marketing series, Paper No. 1-009 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2513533 > 
(accessed 25 July 2015). For a critique of an earlier version of this paper see T Lambert and 
Ml Sykuta ‘Why the New Evidence on Minimum Resale Price Maintenance Does Not 
Justify a Per Se or Quick Look Approach’ (Nov 13, 2013) Competition Policy International.  
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This difference stems from qualifying minimum RPM schemes as 
object restrictions. However, as will be explained in detail below only those 
restrictions should be qualified as restrictions by object that typically, that is 
to say in the majority of cases, have negative effects on competition. For 
minimum RPM schemes economic theory suggests that there are many cases 
where those schemes have positive effects. The Commission’s approach has 
therefore come under criticism.24 
3. Should minimum RPM be treated as an object restriction? 
The most visible effect which minimum RPM schemes may have are 
increased prices for final consumers. 25  The reduction of intra-brand 
competition through minimum RPM schemes can increase the supplier’s 
margin26 thereby reducing an important incentive for increasing productive 
efficiency in particular where the supplier has market power.27 Moreover, 
minimum RPM schemes can be employed to co-ordinate and monitor cartels 
by offering a tool to easily detect price-cutters.28 Such cartels can be formed 
                                                
24 See, for example, Jones, supra n 4; Hofmann supra n 4; Font-Galarza, Maier-Rigaud & 
Figueroa supra n 4; Gippini-Fournier supra n 4 515. 
25 See, eg the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer in Leegin supra n 2. For an opposing 
view see P Ippolito ‘RPM Myths That Muddy the Discussion (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 
154ff. 
26 It may also soften downstream competition or deter downstream entry, because of the 
reduction in downstream price competition, see Office of Fair Trading, ‘An evaluation of 
the impact upon productivity of ending resale price maintenance on books’ (2008) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_
oft/economic_research/oft981.pdf accessed 24 July 2015. See also PW Dobson and M 
Waterson, ‘The  Competition Effect of Industry-Wide Vertical Price Fixing in Bilateral 
Oligopoly’ (2007) 25 International Journal of Industrial Organization, 953–954. 
27 On the importance of intra-brand competition see RL Steiner, ‘Intrabrand Competition-
Stepchild of Antitrust’ (1991) 36 Antitrust Bulletin 155. 
28 See, eg RA Posner, Antitrust Law (UCP 2001) 172; TR Overstreet, ‘Resale Price 
Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence’ (1983) FTC Bureau of 
Economics Staff Report 133; H Marvel and S McCafferty, ‘Resale Price Maintenance and 
Quality Certiﬁcation’(1984) 15 Rand Journal of Economics 346ff. P Jones Harbour/L Price, 
‘RPM and the Rule of Reason: Ready Or Not, Here We Come?’ (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 
231. See eg Argos Ltd. v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1318, para 141. 
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at upstream level but it is equally possible that powerful retailers ‘negotiate’ 
the minimum RPM price with the supplier.29  
However, economic theory has stressed that minimum RPM can 
yield pro-competitive effects by boosting both intra-brand and inter-brand 
competition.30 Free-riding is an important element in the minimum RPM 
debate.31 Minimum RPM schemes prevent cases where the consumer makes 
use of the additional services provided by one retailer and then buys the 
goods at another retailer that is cheaper as a result of not providing such 
services.32 A classical, often cited, example is competition between brick 
and mortar shops and internet shops, where consumers would examine the 
product and receive demonstrations of a product at a brick and mortar shop 
but would then buy it cheaper online.33 Besides preventing the free-rider 
problem, minimum RPM schemes increase the likelihood that a product is 
stocked in sufficient quantities even where there are uncertainties about the 
demand34 because the retailer does not have to fear declining prices. 
While these issues concern intra-brand competition, minimum RPM 
schemes might also have pro-competitive effects on inter-brand competition. 
                                                
29 See also Vertical Guidelines supra n 3 para 224; J Lever and S Neubauer, ‘Vertical 
Restraints and Their Motivation and Justification’ (2000) European Competition Law 
Review 7ff; U Bernitz ‘Resale price maintenance in comparative perspective’ in A Ezrachi 
(ed), Research Handbook On International Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2012) 430. B 
Jullien & P Rey, ‘Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion’ (2007) 22 RAND Journal of 
Economics 983, 996. 
30 For a good overview on the possible positive and negative effect of resale price 
maintenance see OECD, Policy Roundtable: Resale Price Maintenance (2008) 29. 
31 Challenging free rider justifications in support of RPM see M Lao, ‘The Internet 
Phenomenon and ‘Free Rider’ Issues’ (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 473. 
32  H Marvel, ‘The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the Conventional 
Wisdom’ (1994) 63 Antitrust Law Journal 59; Marvel and McCafferty  supra n 28. 
33 In this vein US amicus curiae in Leegin supra n 2. But also e.g. Hofmann supra n 4 704ff; 
Font-Galarza, Maier-Rigaud & Figueroa supra n 4 4. For the opposite view arguing that this 
is a too simplistic picture see eg, Lao, supra n 31 473. See also GT Gundlach, JP Cannon 
and KC Manning, ‘Free riding and resale price maintenance: Insights from marketing 
research and practice’ (2010) 55 Antitrust Bulletin 381-422.  
34 See R Deneckere, H Marvel and J Peck, ’Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: 
Markdowns as Destructive Competition’ (1997) 87 American Economic Review 619.  
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Economic theory identified an interest of the manufactures in minimum 
RPM schemes as the extra margin of the retailers can encourage them to 
invest in additional services or promotions,35 which help in inter-brand non-
price competition.36 Moreover, the US Supreme Court identified a greater 
choice ‘among low-price, low-service brands; high-price, high-service 
brands and brands falling in between’37 as a consumer welfare gain and 
highlighted that minimum RPM schemes could facilitate market entry.38 The 
mixed economic theory, which provides arguments for and against anti-
competitive effects39  led the US Supreme Court to find that a per-se 
prohibition would no longer be justified and a rule of reason approach 
should apply.40 
In a nutshell, economic theory suggests that minimum RPM, 
depending on the market context, may account for pro or anticompetitive 
effects41 and challenges its classification as object restriction. This is not to 
suggest that EU competition law does not accept that minimum RPM may 
exceptionally account for pro-competitive effects, in which case the parties 
can plead Article 101 (3) TFEU. Yet, it would be rather difficult to succeed 
with such a defence. While the Commission recognises the theoretical 
                                                
35  M Kneepkens, ‘Resale Price Maintenance: Economics Call for a More Balanced 
Approach’ (2007) 28 European Competition Law Review 656, 658, see also G Shaffer,  
‘Slotting  Allowances  and  Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating 
Practices’ (1991) 22 RAND Journal of Economics 120, 130. 
36 See Posner supra n 28173. 
37 Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS Inc. supra n 2  2.  
38 Ibid at 11-12. See also Posner supra n 28 172ff.; Marvel and McCafferty,supra n 28; See 
F Mathewson and R Winter, ‘The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance’ (1998) 
13 Review of Industrial Organization 74. 
39 See in particular M Bennett, A Fletcher, E Giovannetti and D Stallibrass, ‘Resale Price 
Maintenance: Explaining the Controversy, and Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced 
Policy’ (2011) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1278, 1287-1295 
40 Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS Inc. supra n 2. 
41 See, eg Bannett, Fletcher, Giovannetti and Stallibrass supra n 39, 1287-1295 .  
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possibility of applying Article 101 (3) TFEU it seems rather reserved stating 
that  
Including RPM in an agreement gives rise to the 
presumption that the agreement restricts competition and 
thus falls within Article 101(1). It also gives rise to the 
presumption that the agreement is unlikely to fulfil the 
conditions of Article 101(3), for which reason the block 
exemption does not apply. However, undertakings have 
the possibility to plead an efficiency defence under 
Article 101(3) in an individual case.42 
 
In light of this statement, minimum RPM will fall under the object category, 
with a low burden of proof for the Commission to discharge, while the 
undertakings have an almost insurmountable task, of proving efficiencies 
under 101(3) TFEU. With regard to economic theory it would appear better 
to heighten the Commission’s burden of proof in object cases, where 
economic theory suggests that such agreements are not always harmful. The 
CJ case law to which we now turn may now pave the way in this direction. 
  
                                                
42 Vertical Guidelines supra n 3 para 223. 
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C. CJ’s approach to object cases 
While economic thinking appears to suggest that the effects of minimum 
RPM are nuanced, the current EU legal framework only allows for the 
treatment of such agreements as object restrictions. In light of this state of 
affairs, this article moves on to show that recent case law of the CJ may 
account for a wider interpretation of object restrictions applicable 
constructively in the area of minimum RPM. This section discusses the 
approach to object restrictions in EU competition law and suggests that some 
limited consideration of effects is allowed in object cases. It presents the 
approach to object cases prior to Allianz Hungária that has arguably blurred 
the line between object and effect restrictions and allowed for a more 
detailed effects analysis in object cases. Section 4 presents the CJ’s approach 
in Allianz Hungária and argues that while blurring the dividing line between 
object and effect restrictions is regrettable, it may be used constructively by 
applying it  in the area of minimum RPM. 
Background: object restrictions prior to Allianz Hungária 
In the context of Article 101(1) TFEU, restrictions by object encompass the 
most serious distortions of competition. In general, Article 101(1) TFEU 
prohibits agreements restricting competition either by their object or effect. 
These are alternative and not cumulative conditions.43 First, it is established 
                                                
43 Joined Cases T-202/98, T-204/98 and T-207/98 Tate & Lyle and others v Commission 
[2001] ECR II-2035 para 72; Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 & T-388/94 
European Night Services and others v Commission [1998] ECR II-3141, para 136; Case T-
142/89 Boël v Commission [1995] ECR II-867 para 89; Case T-67/01 JCB Service [2004] 
ECR II-49 para 117; Case T-152/89 ILRO v Commission [1995] ECR II-1197 para 32; Case 
C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and Others [2009] ECR I-4529 para 28, 30; Joined Cases 56 
and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299, 342; Case 56/65 Société 
Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, 249; Case 45/85 Verband der 
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whether an agreement has the restriction of competition as its object, as ‘[...] 
there is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement once 
it appears that it has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition’.44 To determine whether an object restriction exists the purpose 
of the agreement has to be considered,45 while taking into account its legal 
and economic context.46 Hence, the specific legal or factual context is used 
to verify whether an alleged object restriction has in fact the potential to 
restrict competition.47  
In terms of enforcement, object restrictions have the advantage that 
there is no need to provide evidence of actual effects on competition.48 Only 
                                                                                                                        
Sachversicherer v Commission [1987] ECR 405 para 39; Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline 
Services v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969 para 55; Case C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger 
Bräu [1991] ECR I-935 para 13. 
44 Case C-68/12 Slovenská sporiteľňa [2013] para 75; Joined Cases C-238/99P, C-244/99P, 
C-245/99P, C-247/99P, C-250/99P, C-251/99P, C-252/99P and C-254/99P Limburgse Vinyl 
Maatschappij and others [2002] ECR I-8375 para 508; Consten and Grundig supra n 43 
para 299. 
45 See in this regard Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm supra n 43. For 
classical restrictions by object containing price-fixing, market-sharing or the control of 
outlets see Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion v Commission [1995] ECR II-1063 para 109 but also 
restrictions that are designed to restrict parallel trade; Joined Cases C-501/06P, C-513/06P, 
C-515/06P and C-519/06P GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission [2009] ECR I-9291 
para 59. The intention of the parties is not an essential factor but can be taken into account, 
see T-Mobile Netherlands and Others supra n 43 para 27; See also Joined cases 96-102, 
104, 105, 108 and 110/82 IAZ International Belgium and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 
3369, para 23-25. With regard to the restriction of competition by object see, eg, O Odudu, 
‘Interpreting Article 81(1): the object requirement revisited’ (2001) 26 European Law 
Review 379–390; S King, The Object Box: Law, Policy or Myth? (2011) 7(2) European 
Competition Journal 269-296. 
46 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League and others 
[2011] ECR I-9083 para 136; GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission supra n 45 para 58; 
Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique 2011 ECR I-9419 para 35; T-Mobile 
Netherlands and Others supra n 43 para 27; Case 1/71 Cadillon 1971 ECR 351 para 8; 
Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm supra n 43; Allianz Hungária supra n 1 
para 33, 36; Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la concurrence and Others (judgment 
of 13 December 2012) para 21. 
47 Football Association Premier League and others supra n 46 para 135; Pierre Fabre 
Dermo-Cosmétique supra n 46 para 34; T-Mobile Netherlands and Others supra n 43 paras 
28, 30; GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission supra n 45 para 55. 
48 See, for example, Case C-209/07 Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers [2008] 
ECR I-8637 paras 16, 21; Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 34; T-Mobile Netherlands and 
Others supra n 43 para 27; NV IAZ and others v Commission (supra 45 para 25; 
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where no object restriction can be established, the agreement’s effect on 
competition has to be assessed by an in-depth analysis. The Commission’s 
approach to object restrictions reflects the Court’s earlier jurisprudence and 
is summarised in its Guidelines on the application of Article [101(3)] 
TFEU.49 It can be broken down in the following salient points.  
First, object restrictions have by their very nature the potential to 
restrict competition. By their very nature these restrictions must demonstrate 
such a high potential of negative effects on competition that is futile to 
demonstrate actual effects. Effectively the nature of the restriction operates 
as a presumption. Based on the serious nature of the infringement and past 
experience, restrictions by object are likely to produce negative effects.50 
Second, the assessment is conducted based on a number of formalistic 
factors. Some of these factors, as it will be discussed below, allow some 
leeway for a cursory effects analysis.51 These factors include: 
i) the content of the agreement; 
ii) the objectives/purposes pursued by it; and  
iii) the context of the agreement and the actual conduct and 
behaviour of the parties on the market.52 
The case law suggests that there is no need to take account of the effects of 
an agreement when it has as its object the restriction of competition.53 More 
                                                                                                                        
GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission supra n 45 para 55; Pierre Fabre Dermo-
Cosmétique supra n 46 para 34. 
49 Commission (EU), ‘Guidelines on the application of Article [101(3)] of the Treaty’ 
[2004] OJ C 101/97. 
50 Ibid para 21. See, for example, cases cited at supra n 48. 
51 See text to supra 53 below. For a distinction between the ‘orthodox approach’ and the 
‘more analytical approach’ to object restrictions see King supra n 45 271. 
52 Guidelines supra n 49 para 22.  
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controversial remains the classification as object or effect infringement and 
the room, if any, for the analysis of effects under the object category. Indeed, 
despite of the above statement suggesting that concrete effects are 
disregarded in the object analysis, a number of object cases perform some 
analysis of effects, albeit to a different degree.54 The Court has allowed some 
leeway for a limited effects analysis, a) when examining whether the 
agreement has an appreciable effect on competition and trade; and b) when 
looking at the context of the agreement.       
a) Appreciable effect on competition and trade 
The first option allowing for a limited effects evaluation in object cases is 
the ‘appreciability’ criterion, namely the examination of whether the 
agreement has an appreciable effect on competition and trade, though recent 
case law appears to have minimised this possibility. Expedia suggests that 
object restrictions will always be regarded as having an appreciable effect on 
competition.55 Nevertheless, there may be some scope for the latter analysis, 
when assessing whether an agreement may have an appreciable effect on 
inter-state trade (rather than on competition). In Louis Erauw-Jacquery an 
                                                                                                                        
53 See quote at supra n 44 and the cases cited therein. 
54  For a thorough discussion of the approach to ‘object’ restrictions see D Bailey, 
‘Restrictions of Competition by Object under Article 101 TFEU’ (2012) 49 Common 
Market Law Review 559. Bailey argues that the EU courts have used three methods to assess 
whether an agreement is anticompetitive by object; a) by reference to the ‘hardcore 
restrictions’ listed in the Treaty competition provisions or Block Exemption Regulations 
and previously decided cases; b) by considering the purpose and economic context of the 
agreement and c) by undertaking an abridged competitive analysis. Ibid 570. See also P Van 
Cleynenbreugel, ‘Article 101 TFEU and the EU Courts: Adapting Legal Form to the 
Realities of Modernization?’ (2014) CMLRev 1381, 1409-1416 arguing that the case law on 
object restrictions allows a quick look’ analysis into effects. 
55 Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la concurrence and Others supra n 45 paras 35-7. The 
approach in Expedia is now incorporated in the new Commission Notice on agreements of 
minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union C(2014) 4136 final, (Brussels, 25 June 
2014) para 2.  
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export ban was held to be potentially outside Article 101(1) due to the 
financial commitment required for the development of the products.56 In 
addition the agreement contained also a minimum RPM clause. The Court in 
a somewhat ambiguous statement held that “...those agreements have the 
same effects as a price system fixed by a horizontal agreement. In such 
circumstances the object and effect of such a provision is to restrict 
competition within the common market.”57 Thus, the Court treated minimum 
RPM arrangements as object restrictions and the fact that it also mentioned 
effects is not relevant. However, the Court asked the referring court to 
ascertain whether the contested agreement had an appreciable effect on trade 
between Member States and in that regard account must be had on whether 
the agreement forms part of a cluster of similar agreements, on the breeder’s 
market share and on the ability of the producers bound by the agreement to 
export the seeds.58 Therefore, it appears that in the analysis of appreciability 
the Court introduced elements of an effects analysis in order to evaluate the 
effect on cross-border trade of a prima facie object restriction.  
b) Contextual analysis: limited role of ‘effects’ 
The second option for a limited effects analysis deserves a closer reading of 
the case law on object restrictions. It suggests that a limited effects analysis 
takes place at the assessment of the agreement’s economic context, which 
may have acted as a stepping-stone for the more elaborated analysis in 
Allianz Hungária, examined in section 4.  
                                                
56 Case 27/87 SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne SC [1988] ECR 1919 para 9-
11. 
57 Ibid para 15. 
58 Ibid para 17-19.  
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In Consten and Grundig, the Commission found that the agreement 
had as its object an adverse effect on competition, because it had the aim of 
protecting Consten from competition in the sale of Grundig products.59 
Nonetheless, a limited effects analysis was performed as the Court briefly 
considered the effects of absolute territorial protection upon competition 
between producers as well as competition between distributors. In particular, 
the Court held that the absolute territorial protection granted to Consten for 
Grundig products in the French market results 
 
 […] in the isolation of the French market and makes it 
possible to charge for the products in question prices 
which are sheltered from all effective competition. In 
addition the more producers succeed in their efforts to 
render their own makes of products artificially distinct in 
the eyes of the consumer, the more the effectiveness of 
competition between producers tends to diminish. 
Because of the considerable impact of distribution costs 
on the aggregate cost price, it seems important that 
competition between dealers should also be stimulated. 
The efforts of the dealer are stimulated by competition 
between distributors of products of the same make. Since 
the agreement thus aims at isolating the French market 
for Grundig products and maintaining artificially for 
products of a very well-known brand, separate national 
markets within the Community, it is therefore such as to 
distort competition in the common market...No further 
consideration of economic data (price differences 
between France and Germany, representative character 
of the type of appliance considered, level of overheads 
born by Consten) [...] can in any way lead [...] to a 
different solution [...] (emphasis added).60  
 
In GlaxoSmithKline the General Court (GC) interpreted Consten and 
Grundig in the direction that not all agreements intended to limit parallel 
                                                
59 Consten and Grundig supra n 43 Opinion of AG Roemer, 358. It should be noted that AG 
Roemer advocated a more detailed effects analysis and considered the Commission analysis 
insufficiently based. 
60 Consten and Grundig supra n 43 343. 
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trade must be considered by their nature, that is to say, independently of any 
competitive analysis, to have as their object the restriction of competition. 
The GC rather performed ‘an abridged but real’ 61  economic analysis 
showing that the agreement sought to eliminate competition at the wholesale 
level. If account were to be taken of the legal and economic context of the 
agreement, then it could not be presumed that it would lead to 
anticompetitive effects.62 Thus, the GC suggested that the examination of the 
agreement in its legal and economic context allows for a limited 
consideration of possible effects.  
However on appeal, the CJ reversed the GC’s analysis on the object 
point and resorted to a formalistic analysis of the object category which 
suggests that an agreement restricting parallel trade will in all instances 
amount to a restriction of competition by object. The difference in approach 
can be possibly explained in light of the different approach to the aims of EU 
competition law adopted by the CJ (compared to that of the GC) and the 
notion attributed to restrictions of competition, since the CJ held that  
there is nothing in that provision to indicate that only 
those agreements which deprive consumers of certain 
advantages may have an anti-competitive object [...] it 
must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, like 
other competition rules laid down in the Treaty, Article 
[101 TFEU] aims to protect not only the interests of 
competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the 
market and, in so doing, competition as such. 
Consequently, for a finding that an agreement has an 
anti-competitive object, it is not necessary that final 
                                                
61 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission supra n 42 paras 120. 
62Ibid 122, 134, 147. This judgement has sparked the discussion on the aims and the 
appropriate enforcement standard in EU competition law. See, for example, V Korah, 
‘Judgment of the Court of First Instance in GlaxoSmithKline’ (2007) 6 CompLaw 101.  
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consumers be deprived of the advantages of effective 
competition in terms of supply or price.63  
 
As AG Trstenjak noted in her Opinion “regard must be had, in particular, to 
existing experience according to which, in all probability, certain types of 
agreement have a negative impact in the market and jeopardise the 
objectives pursued by the Community’s competition legislation”.64 Thus, if 
one takes a different view as to the objectives of EU competition law, then 
the analysis of an agreement in its legal and economic context may yield 
different outcomes. If one subscribes to the Court’s pronouncements that EU 
competition law aims at the protection of the market structure, an agreement 
that divides markets along national lines, clearly has the object of restricting 
competition, the latter taken to mean competitive market structure. On the 
contrary, if one accepts the consumer welfare goal of competition law, then 
the analysis of this agreement in its legal and economic context does not 
amount to a restriction of competition, i.e. adverse impact on final consumer 
prices. 
The analysis in Beef Industry is in the same vein.65 In this case the 
Court was asked whether an agreement between Irish beef processors to 
reduce overcapacity in the beef industry sector is to be regarded by reason of 
its object alone as anticompetitive. Irish beef processors argued that the 
arrangements in question were not restrictive by object since they lacked an 
anti-competitive aim and did not entail injurious consequences for 
                                                
63  GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission supra n 45 para 63. T-Mobile 
Netherlands and Others supra n 45, paras 38-39. 
64 GlaxoSmithKline supra n 45 Opinion of AG Trstenjak para 91. 
65 Beef Industry supra n 48. 
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consumers and more generally for competition.66 This argument was rejected 
by the Court that stated: 
 
In fact, to determine whether an agreement comes within 
the prohibition laid down in Article [101(1) TFEU], 
close regard must be paid to the wording of its 
provisions and to the objectives which it is intended to 
attain. In that regard, even supposing it to be established 
that the parties to an agreement acted without any 
subjective intention of restricting competition, but with 
the object of remedying the effects of a crisis in their 
sector, such considerations are irrelevant for the 
purposes of applying that provision. Indeed, an 
agreement may be regarded as having a restrictive object 
even if it does not have the restriction of competition as 
its sole aim but also pursues other legitimate objectives. 
It is only in connection with Article [101(3) TFEU] that 
matters such as those relied upon by BIDS may, if 
appropriate, be taken into consideration... (emphasis 
added)67 
 
Even though the aim of the arrangements at issue was to remedy the effects 
of the crisis in the beef industry sector, this was to be achieved through a 
mechanism intended to encourage the withdrawal of competitors that would 
change the structure of the market appreciably.68 Thus, the Court appears to 
have followed AG Trstenjak that noted that the agreed reduction in 
production capacity has as a necessary consequence the restriction of 
competition despite the “pro-competitive object or a primary objective of the 
[BIDS] agreements which is unobjectionable from a competition point of 
view”.69 The latter seems to be a logical contradiction; how can agreements 
with a primary pro-competitive objective amount to a restriction of 
                                                
66 Ibid para 19. 
67 Ibid para 21. 
68 Ibid para 31. 
69 Beef Industry supra n 48 Opinion of AG Trstenjak para 94. 
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competition? Or is it merely that the latter is taken as synonymous to 
economic rivalry? 
In this case, like in GlaxoSmithKline, the outcome may have been 
different had the Court opted for a more economic based approach. One 
could disagree with the outcome of this case, based on one’s views as to the 
aims of competition law. This nonetheless does not detract from the fact that 
the Court in Beef Industry performed a contextual evaluation of the terms of 
the agreement in their market context. 70  In relation to this judgment, 
Andreangeli commented that “the Court of Justice went a step beyond its 
existing case law by emphasizing the need to analyse the BIDS agreements 
against the very structure of the market and especially against the degree of 
concentration that characterized it and to appraise its consequences for 
foreclosure as well as for current and future market shares”.71  
Pierre Fabre provides another example of a limited effects 
examination in the contextual analysis. In this case, the Court was asked to 
ascertain whether an absolute prohibition on internet sales contained in a 
selective distribution agreement amounted to an object restriction.72 The 
Court after analysing legitimate requirements that improve non-price 
competition concluded that the ban on internet sales amounts to a restriction 
by object  
 […] following an individual and specific examination 
of the content and objective of that contractual clause 
                                                
70 Beef Industry supra n 48 para 32-40. Andreangeli identified the Court’s attempt to import 
a more economics guided approach in the analysis of object restrictions. See A Andreangeli, 
‘From Mobile Phones to Cattle: How the Court of Justice Is Reframing the Approach to 
Article 101 (Formerly 81 EC Treaty) of the EU Treaty’ (2011) Competition Law Review  
215, 234.  
71 Ibid 235. 
72 Pierre Fabre supra n 46 para 31. 
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and the legal and economic context of which it forms a 
part, it is apparent that, having regard to the properties of 
the products at issue, that clause is not objectively 
justified.73 
 
As AG Mazák observed in Pierre Fabre, the anticompetitive object of an 
agreement cannot be established in the abstract by using an abstract 
formula.74 An individualised assessment is required and the fact that similar 
agreements were regarded as object restrictions in the past does not relieve 
the Commission and National Competition Authorities (NCAs) from their 
duty to conduct an individual examination.75 This is further supported by AG 
Trstenjak in GlaxoSmithKline where she stated that  
 [...] regard must be had, in particular, to existing 
experience according to which, in all probability, certain 
types of agreement have a negative impact in the market 
and jeopardise the objectives pursued by the 
Community’s competition legislation. Under this 
approach, the character of the restriction of competition 
by object as a form of inchoate offence becomes 
particularly clear, since certain types of agreement (such 
as price-fixing agreements, customer sharing or resale 
price maintenance) are classified, on the basis of existing 
experience, as restrictions of competition by object, 
without any specific analysis of their effects. This 
standardised approach certainly creates legal certainty. 
However, it is always subject to the proviso that the 
legal and economic context of the agreement to be 
examined does not preclude application of this 
standardised assessment. (emphasis added)76  
 
The above suggests that the contextual analysis of the agreement serves as a 
balancing factor in the standardised approach in object cases and allows for a 
                                                
73 Ibid 47. 
74 An observation useful for cases not fitting neatly in the traditional object category and in 
this case justified by the novelty of the case examining a ban on internet sales for the first 
time. 
75 Pierre Fabre supra n 46 Opinion of AG Mazák para 26-27. 
76 GlaxoSmithKine supra n 45 Opinion of AG Trstenjak para 91. 
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limited evaluation of effects. The balancing role of the agreement’s context 
appears to be supported also by the Opinion of AG Wahl in Groupement des 
Cartes Bancaires v Commission, where he commented that the examination 
of the legal and economic context can act as an aggravating or mitigating 
factor towards the finding of an anticompetitive agreement by object; 
namely that if the context and objective of the agreement suggest that it has 
negative effects then the contextual analysis can reinforce this finding, but it 
would not suffice to establish an anticompetitive object on its own.77 
Despite the fact that certain types of agreements such as price fixing, 
market sharing or minimum RPM are traditionally categorised as object 
restrictions, there is still room to advance the argument that  based on their 
legal and economic context, they may not amount to an object restriction. 
Allianz Hungária has further expanded this contextual analysis, as will be 
highlighted in the following section 4. 
  
                                                
77  Case C-67/13P Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission (judgment of 11 
September 2014) Opinion of AG Wahl paras 44, 138-139.  
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D. Blurring the line: Allianz Hungária 
The Court’s approach in Allianz Hungária has expanded the contextual 
analysis for object restrictions, thereby allowing for a more detailed analysis 
of effects. 78  Thus, it can be viewed as a change to its position in 
GlaxoSmithKline where it rejected the GC’s ‘abridged but real analysis’ of 
object restrictions.79 At the same time it has (rightly) been criticised for 
blurring the line between object and effect cases.80 This section examines 
whether the Allianz Hungária approach can nonetheless be viewed as at least 
providing some welcomed development as subsequently applied by the CJ in 
Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission.81 
 
1. Factual background 
The case arose from a preliminary reference by the Hungarian Supreme 
Court and the request has been made in the context of a dispute between 
insurance companies (Allianz and Generali) and car dealers with the 
Hungarian Competition Authority that imposed fines for a number of 
agreements having the object of restricting competition in the car insurance 
contracts market and the car repair services market.82 
                                                
78 See, for example, Guidelines on the application of Article [101(3)] of the Treaty supra n 
49 para 13, 33; Commission (EU), ‘Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements’ [2011] C 
11/1 para 269; Commission(EC), ‘Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 EC of the Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings’ [2009] OJ C45/7 para 19; N Kroes, ‘European Competition Policy – 
Delivering Better Markets and Better Choices’ (2005) (Speech 05/512). 
79 See text to supra n 62. 
80 AG Wahl supra n 77 paras 50-52. AG Wahl commented that it is difficult to distinguish 
between the analysis of the context in Allianz Hungária from an effects analysis.  
81 Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission supra n 77. 
82 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 paras 2, 12. 
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In particular, the agreements between the insurance companies and 
the dealers have been summarised by the Court as follows: 
i. horizontal agreements consisting of three decisions taken by 
the national car dealers association in the period 2003 and 2005 that 
set out ‘recommended prices’ to the authorised dealers for car 
repairs and which were applicable to the insurers;  
ii. framework agreements (in the period 2004 and 2005) 
between the national car dealers association and Allianz and 
individual agreements signed simultaneously between certain 
authorised dealers and Allianz and Generali respectively. These 
agreements made the hourly repair charge dependent on the number 
of insurance  policies signed by the car dealers; and 
iii. various agreements (in the period 2000 and 2005) between 
Allianz and Generali, on the one part, and certain car dealers acting 
as insurance brokers, on the other, setting a minimum number or 
percentage of car insurance policies to be obtained by the broker 
over a given period of time and by providing that the broker’s 
remuneration be fixed according to the number of policies taken out 
with the insurer.83 
The parties challenged the decision by the Hungarian Competition 
Authority. The latter was partially reversed at first instance, but then was 
restored on appeal, following which the parties brought proceedings before 
                                                
83 Ibid, para 11. 
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the Hungarian Supreme Court that decided to stay its proceedings and refer 
the following question to the Court: 
 
Do bilateral agreements between an insurance company 
and individual car repairers, or between an insurance 
company and a car repairers’ association, under which 
the hourly repair charge paid by the insurance company 
to the repairer for the repair of vehicles insured by the 
insurance company depends, among other things, on the 
number and percentage of insurance policies taken out 
with the insurance company through the repairer, acting 
as the insurance broker for the insurance company in 
question, qualify as agreements which have as their 
object the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition, and thus contravene Article 101(1) 
TFEU?84 
 
2. The CJ’s analysis  
The Court resorted to its traditional formulated analysis for the assessment 
of object restrictions and stated that when determining whether an agreement 
involves a restriction of competition ‘by object’ regard must be paid to the 
content of the agreement’s provisions, its objectives and its legal and 
economic context. 85  However, the Court proceeded to make a further 
statement that arguably allows for a broader interpretation of the Court’s 
                                                
84 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 paras 13, 16. 
85 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 36. IAZ and others v Commission supra n 45 paras 23-
25; T-Mobile Netherlands and Others supra n 45; GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v 
Commission supra n 45 para 58; Football Association Premier League and others supra n 
47 para 136; Pierre Fabre Dermo – Cosmetique supra n 46 para 35. Before addressing the 
preliminary question, the Court had to rule on admissibility, since Article 101(1) TFEU was 
not applicable in this case because the agreements at issue had no impact on intra-
Community trade. Allianz Hungária supra n 1 paras 17-30. The Court disagreed with AG 
Cruz Villalon that considered the preliminary reference at issue as inadmissible; 
nonetheless, he went on to analyse the substance of the proceedings in the event the Court 
viewed the reference as admissible. Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon in Allianz Hungária supra 
n 1 para 49. 
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approach to object restrictions that transcends the tripartite content – 
objective – context analysis and has attracted some criticism.86 It stated that 
When determining that context, it is also appropriate to 
take into consideration the nature of the goods or 
services affected, as well as the real conditions of the 
functioning and structure of the market or markets in 
question (see Expedia, paragraph 21 and the case-law 
cited).87 
 
From a literal reading of the Court’s formulation, it seems that it has added 
more analytical rigour when examining the economic context of an 
agreement. As the analysis in section 3 above suggested, the Court quickly 
brushed aside the analysis of the legal and economic context in object 
restrictions, while following Allianz Hungária the latter may play a much 
more significant role. In what follows, we discuss the Court’s analysis in 
relation to the content, objectives and legal and economic context of the 
agreements at hand.   
First, in assessing the content of the agreement, the Court remarks 
that the agreements relate to the hourly charge paid by insurance companies 
to car dealers acting as car repairers and link this remuneration with the 
number of insurance contracts sold by the dealers. It further noted the link 
between the car insurance and car repair markets and the dual capacity of car 
dealers as car repairers and car insurance brokers. While this link does not 
automatically mean that the agreement amounts to a restriction of 
competition by object, it does constitute an important factor in assessing that 
                                                
86 See P Harrison, ‘The Court of Justice’s Judgment in Allianz Hungária is Wrong and 
Needs Correcting’ (May 2013) CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1; C Graham, ‘Methods for 
Determining Whether an Agreement Restricts Competition: comment on Allianz Hungária’ 
(2013) 38 ELRev 542. C I Nagy, The Distinction between Anti-competitive Object and 
Effect after Allianz: The End of Coherence in Competition Analysis? (2013) 36 World 
Comp 541. 
87 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 36.  
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the agreement is by its very nature injurious to the proper functioning of 
normal competition.88  
All in all, in this case, the content of the agreements did not reveal on 
its own that the latter constituted object restrictions. Therefore, the Court 
proceeded to the next step of the tripartite test,89 and examined the objective 
of the agreement. The Court analysis on the purpose of the agreements was 
misplaced. First, it remarked that in as much as the agreements affected both 
the car insurance and the car repair markets, their respective objectives 
should be assessed in relation to both markets.90 However, following this 
and in respect to the car insurance market, the Court curiously observed that 
the objective of the agreement is to maintain or increase the insurers’ market 
shares. It is respectfully submitted that this is not a questionable objective; to 
the contrary, the process of rivalry forms the very essence of competition.91 
Further, in relation to the car repair market, the Court left this issue to the 
referring court.92 
Thus, the Court failed to identify an objective which is capable of 
tainting the agreement with an anticompetitive object. On the contrary, AG 
Cruz Villalon stated that “in the light of their content and objectives, the 
capacity of the agreements at issue to restrict competition is not as high as 
                                                
88 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 paras 39-41. 
89 Here it is interesting to note that AG Cruz Villalon was of the opinion that the content and 
the objectives of the said agreements (examined together in his opinion) did not warrant an 
object classification. AG Opinion in Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 68. 
90 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 42. 
91 Ibid para 44. See also AG Opinion in Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 87. 
92 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 paras 49-50. 
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that of the vertical agreements which the case law has held in the past to be 
restrictions by object.”93 
The Court went on to assess the economic and legal context of the 
agreement. In assessing the legal context, it pointed to the existence of a 
domestic law requiring the dealers when acting as intermediaries or 
insurance brokers to act independently from insurance companies. 
Therefore, it appears that when the agreement at hand is in breach of 
domestic law, this will act as an aggravating factor in assessing the existence 
of an object restriction.94 In relation to the economic context the Court 
invited the referring court to determine this by taking into account “the 
structure of that market, the existence of alternative distribution channels 
and their respective importance and the market power of the companies 
concerned”.95 In Allianz Hungária, and leaving aside potential objections to 
this approach (discussed in section 5) the Court reformulated the evaluation 
of the economic context in object cases by importing elements from an 
effects analysis, yet falling short of a full-fledged analysis. According to 
Italianer, this analysis resembles the US Supreme Court’s sliding scale 
approach situating the restraint within a continuum.96 
  
                                                
93 AG Opinion in Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 81. 
94 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 47. 
95 Ibid para 48 (emphasis added). 
96 See A Italianer, ‘Competitor Agreements under EU Competition Law’ (Speech, 26 
September 2013) (40th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, 
Fordham Competition Law Institute) 5. See also Nagy supra n 86 563.  
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3. Subsequent developments: Groupement des Cartes Bancaires 
The Court has further affirmed its Allianz Hungária approach in 
Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission.97 This constitutes the first 
case where the Court reverses the Commission’s approach on object 
analysis. It concerned a grouping of French banks (‘Grouping’) established 
in 1984 in order to achieve interoperability for using the cards issued by its 
members (CB system). In practice this meant that a CB card could be used 
with all traders affiliated to the CB system through any member of the 
Grouping and also for making cash withdrawals from cash points operated 
by all other members. In 2002, the Grouping adopted three pricing 
mechanisms in order to balance the issuing side with the acquiring side. In a 
nutshell, these measures ensured that entrants to the group had to pay 
additional fees where they issued more CB cards (issuing side) as compared 
to affiliating new traders offering points (acquiring side) where these cards 
could be used. 
The Court first reiterated its approach to object restrictions, namely 
that in order for an agreement to qualify as a restriction by object regard 
must be had to its content, objectives and the relevant legal and economic 
context. In determining the context, the Court invoked the contested 
formulation in Allianz Hungária.98 Second, the Court in line with AG Wahl 
and contrary to the GC underlined that object restrictions must be interpreted 
restrictively and that “the concept of restriction of competition ‘by object’ 
                                                
97 Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission supra n 76. 
98 Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission supra n 77 para 53.  
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can be applied only to certain types of coordination between undertakings 
which reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition”(emphasis added).99 
The GC found that the object of the contested measures restricted 
competition of new entrants in the French issuing card market as these 
required the banks to pay a fee or limit their card issuing activity.100 The 
Court criticised the GC for failing to establish how the contested measures 
could reveal a sufficient degree of harm in order to be classified as object 
restrictions. 101  It also commented that the GC rejected the appellants’ 
arguments that the measures aimed at developing the acquisition activities of 
the member banks in order to achieve an optimal balance between acquiring 
and issuing activities and conflated the analysis of the relevant market (two 
sided payment systems market) with the analysis of the context of the 
agreement and wrongfully classified it as a restriction by object.102 It also 
pointed to the legitimate objective of the measures to combat free-riding, 
which was also acknowledged by the GC. 103 Although this objective alone 
does not suffice to bring a practice outside the object classification,104 it 
appears that it can play a role when assessing the context  of an apparent 
restriction.  
The Court then explained why the contested measures differed from 
the measures under the BIDS scheme. The analysis of the Court suggests that 
the Commission, following Allianz Hungária and Groupement des Cartes 
Bancaires v Commission, should be more cautious when examining the legal 
                                                
99 Ibid para 58.  
100 Ibid para 68.  
101 Ibid para 69. 
102 Ibid paras 72-77.  
103 Ibid para 75. 
104 Ibid para 70. 
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and economic context of the agreement before the latter is classified as an 
object restriction. The CJ explained that the GC could not draw on BIDS, as 
it had not shown how the measure would have changed the market 
structure.105 In general, the GC had failed to establish that “the measures at 
issue, in the light of their wording, objectives and context, displayed a 
sufficient degree of harm to competition to be regarded as having as their 
object a restriction of competition.”106  
Overall, the Court in Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v 
Commission has clarified an important point of principle, namely that object 
restrictions need to be interpreted restrictively. Nonetheless, it applied the 
Allianz Hungária formula and discussed the economic context and the 
legitimate objective of the agreement in some detail. Its approach, even if it 
appears as blurring the line between object and effect categories 107 is 
sensible and can be applied constructively in certain cases, as it will be 
discussed by employing the minimum RPM example.  
  
                                                
105 Ibid para 85 
106 Ibid para 90 (emphasis added).  
107  P Harper, ‘Groupement des Cartes Bancaires Judgement – Rolling Back on the 
Expansion of by Object Infringements’ [2014] CompLaw 321, 326-327. 
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E. In defence of Allianz Hungária: towards a ‘quick effects’ analysis for 
object restrictions?  
Allianz Hungária may be seen as a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence that to 
date has adopted a narrower view to the contextual analysis. Commentators 
have - justifiably- criticized the Court for an imprudent widening of the 
object category that unnecessarily blurs the distinction between ‘object’ and 
‘effect’ and will enable the Commission to classify more restrictions under 
the object category. 108  Allianz Hungária can be read as a wrongful 
classification of vertical agreements under the object category that 
potentially enables the Commission and NCAs to invoke the object 
restriction and evade a more detailed and time/resource intensive effects 
analysis in vertical as well as horizontal cases. Further, this approach, not yet 
tested or applied by the Commission, may complicate competition law 
enforcement by NCAs as it seems to further complicate the identification of 
object restrictions. 
Allianz Hungária may have been decided in this way in light of the 
potential covert horizontal agreement between the insurance companies 
(Allianz and Generali). The Court expressly referred to the possibility that if 
a horizontal agreement existed between the latter companies, then such an 
agreement would have amounted to market partitioning (object restriction) 
that would have also resulted in the unlawfulness of the vertical 
agreements.109 Therefore, the fact that both the Court and the AG mentioned 
                                                
108 See  Harrison supra n 86; Nagy supra n 86; Graham supra n 86; Van Cleynenbreugel 
supra n 531409-1430.  
109 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 45. The Hungarian Government and the Commission 
disputed the vertical nature of the agreements. Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon in Allianz 
Hungária supra n 1 para 70. Note that AG Cruz Villalon was of the opinion that in order to 
Helene Tyrrell  6/3/2016 18:18
Formatted: English (UK)
Helene Tyrrell  6/3/2016 18:18
Deleted: 86
Helene Tyrrell  6/3/2016 18:18
Formatted: English (UK)
Helene Tyrrell  6/3/2016 18:18
Deleted: 86
Helene Tyrrell  6/3/2016 18:18
Formatted: English (UK)
Helene Tyrrell  6/3/2016 18:18
Deleted: 86
Helene Tyrrell  6/3/2016 18:18
Formatted: Footnote Reference,Appel
note de bas de p,PBO Footnote
Reference,FR + (Complex) Arial,(Latin) 9
pt,(Complex) 10 pt + (Compl...,Footnote,
Greek
Helene Tyrrell  6/3/2016 18:18
Deleted: 1
Helene Tyrrell  6/3/2016 18:18
Formatted: Footnote Reference,Appel
note de bas de p,PBO Footnote
Reference,FR + (Complex) Arial,(Latin) 9
pt,(Complex) 10 pt + (Compl...,Footnote,
Greek
Helene Tyrrell  6/3/2016 18:18
Deleted: 1
36 
 
that the number of vertical agreements at issue may have been influenced by 
a horizontal agreement, thereby suggesting a “hybrid” nature of the 
respective agreements, could have affected the analysis. Though, despite this 
observation both the AG and the Court have classified the agreements as 
vertical. The clear classification of the respective agreements as vertical and 
their treatment as object restrictions may be seen as contrary to current 
economic thinking and the Commission approach to vertical restraints as 
depicted in the block exemption and guidelines. The latter approach suggests 
that vertical restraints are problematic when coupled with market power, an 
issue not discussed in detail by the CJ in Allianz Hungária.      
Further, it is true that the Court made a mistaken reference to 
Expedia.110 Whether this was merely a short sight or rather a deliberate 
choice is hard to tell. In any event though, the Court is entitled to depart 
from its previous jurisprudence and it may well be the case that Allianz 
Hungária forms one of the rare instances that the Court has chosen to do 
so.111 
Contrary to the above criticism, we submit that Allianz Hungária can 
also be read in a different way. The Court required a quick-effects approach 
to be performed in the assessment of the economic context, i.e. looking at 
the nature of the goods or services affected and the real conditions of the 
functioning and structure of the markets in question. 112  This could 
                                                                                                                        
establish a restriction by object in the insurance market, it would be necessary to establish 
an anti-competitive horizontal agreement/concerted practice between Allianz and Generali. 
Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon supra n 1 para 88. 
110 Harrison supra n 86 5-7, Nagy supra n 86 554ff.  
111 For other instances where the Court departed from previous jurisprudence see for 
example, Case 267 and 268/91 Keck & Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097 para 15-16. A Jones, 
‘Left Behind by Modernisation? Restrictions by Object under Article 101(1)’ (2010) 6 
European Competition Journal 649, 662. 
112 See text to supra n 86.  
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potentially prevent the classification of an agreement as object restriction by 
providing a defence to alleged infringers. Essentially this happened in 
Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission. The Court applied the 
Allianz Hungária formula and annulled the GC’s judgment, thereby not 
classifying the contested agreement as an object restriction. This judgment 
therefore further supports the idea that the approach in Allianz Hungária not 
only serves so as to include a measure in the object category that were 
previously examined under the effects category but also vice versa. Thus, so 
as to exclude certain object restrictions from the object category.  
Allianz Hungária does not go as far as the GC in GlaxoSmithKline 
requiring an examination of the potential effects on final consumers. Yet, the 
CJ seems to move away from its categorical rejection in GlaxoSmithKline by 
examining the extent to which the agreement’s potential anticompetitive 
effects might occur within the given market structure. Thus, it furthers the 
CJ’s analysis for object restrictions where it assumes that there will be 
potential anticompetitive effects. It does so by requiring that the competition 
enforcer examines the market structure as part of the legal and economic 
context.113 Therefore, it performs a quick effects analysis which is different 
from the ‘abridged but real economic analysis’ that the GC claimed to have 
applied in GlaxoSmithKline. This might again be explained by the different 
ideas about the aims of EU competition law. The CJ’s quick effects 
approach does not examine possible effects on final consumer but rather on 
the market as such. Arguably this broader contextual analysis would be more 
appropriate for vertical agreements since, as the Commission concedes, as a 
                                                
113 See text to supra n 85ff..  
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general rule and subject to exceptions, Article 101(1) TFEU does not apply 
to vertical agreements.114 The quick effects analysis could thus be applied in 
borderline cases, not to include but rather to exclude them from the object 
category as it would raise the evidential threshold for the Commission in 
object cases. 
  
                                                
114 AG Opinion in Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 69. See VBER supra n 7 Article 2. 
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F. ‘Quick effects’ analysis and its application to minimum RPM 
agreements 
Minimum RPM can be viewed as a borderline object restriction, since, as 
explained above, economic theory does not suggest that such arrangements 
are by their nature harmful to competition. On the contrary, the above 
cursory exposition of the economics related to minimum RPM does not 
suggest that the EU needs to adopt a full-fledged effects analysis for 
minimum RPM schemes;115 instead the quick effects analysis in Allianz 
Hungária may provide a useful middle ground.116 As explained above the 
distinction between object and effect cases should in general rest on whether 
such agreements are typically more likely to produce anti-competitive 
effects. Absent hard economic evidence, minimum RPM arrangements 
should not be classified outright as object restrictions. Instead, the European 
Commission and NCAs should follow the traditional three-step analysis for 
object restrictions, 117 namely address the content of the agreement, its 
objective and then its legal and economic context. Given that minimum 
RPM arrangements can be harmful but also beneficial, the third step may be 
particularly relevant. It may allow some limited examination of effects as 
suggested by the Court in Allianz Hungária, where the Court explained that 
the “context [...] the nature of the goods or services affected, as well as the 
real conditions of the functioning and structure of the market”118 need to be 
examined. 
                                                
115 Bannett, Fletcher, Giovannetti and Stallibrass supra n 39, 1295. 
116 For a different analysis and a critical approach to the ‘quick effects’ approach see Van 
Cleynenbreugel supra n 108 1423.  
117 See text to supra n 51. 
118 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 36.  
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The US Supreme Court in Leegin highlighted a number of cases in 
which minimum RPM schemes might be of particular concern that can also 
inform the analysis on this side of the Atlantic, namely where market shows 
the widespread use of minimum RPM, where the market is characterised by 
undertakings with market power, or where the driving force behind the 
introducing of minimum RPM were retailers.119 These factors were also 
considered important by the Court when examining the agreement in Allianz 
Hungária. It held that “in particular, the structure of the respective market, 
the existence of alternative distribution channels and their respective 
importance and the market power of the companies concerned”120 should be 
explored when examining the economic context. The focusing on these 
aspects is also in line with insights from behavioural economics. In 
concentrated markets, where the undertakings possess significant market 
power or in markets where minimum RPM is wide spread, the demise of 
such practices will be less likely due to bounded rationality.121  
The suggested ‘quick effects’ analysis to minimum RPM following 
Allianz Hungária examines therefore factors, which are typically part of the 
effects examination. Yet the ‘quick effects’ analysis means that no general 
effects analysis needs to take place in the object category. Thus, the 
distinction between object and effect would not be abolished in toto. The test 
is more akin to a structured rule of reason approach122 and underlines the 
                                                
119 Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS Inc supra n 2 p 17-18. 
120 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 48. 
121 A Tor and WJ Rinner, ’Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to the Rule of Reason 
after Leegin’ (December 1, 2009). University of Haifa Faculty of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522948 accessed 25 July 2015 65-67. 
122 On such an approach in the US see NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), and FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 
(1986). With regard to minimum RPM schemes see, eg C Varney, Assistant Attorney 
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importance of the correct allocation of the burden of proof.123 Allianz 
Hungária thereby establishes a middle ground between object and effect 
restrictions. Whether this middle ground is seen as closer to an effects 
analysis or an object approach depends on whether one sees the requirement 
of examining the ‘context [...] the nature of the goods or services affected, as 
well as the real conditions of the functioning and structure of the market’124 
as being close to an effect analysis or as a mere extension of the examination 
of the context of the agreement. If minimum RPM is subjected to a ‘quick 
effects’ analysis then the European Commission, NCAs or private claimants 
will have to prove under 101(1) TFEU that the content and objective of the 
agreement is clearly anticompetitive. If that is not clear from the outset then 
they will have to provide additional evidence on the legal and economic 
context of the agreement that points to its problematic nature or a 
problematic market structure,125 although without delving into a detailed 
effects analysis.  
If the Commission’s quest for a more economics based analysis is 
taken at face value, then Allianz Hungária can be read as supporting such an 
approach. Rather than being easier for the Commission to find an ‘object’ 
restriction, it may actually have the opposite effect as it can raise the stakes 
                                                                                                                        
General Antitrust Division U.S. Department of Justice, ‘Antitrust Federalism: Enhancing 
Federal/State Cooperation, Remarks Prepared for the National Association of Attorneys 
General (Columbia Law School, Oct 2009) 10ff who suggests that the lower courts (as 
indicated by the Supreme Court in Leegin) should develop a structured rule of reason where 
the plaintiff has to show that a) the manufacturer or retailer has sufficient market power b) 
the usage of RPM is widespread c) the RPM seems plausible to significantly foreclose the 
market up or downstream. After establishing these factors it would be for the defendant to 
provide evidence for the pro-competitive nature. 
123  See A Kuenzler, ‘Presumptions as Appropriate Means to Regulate Resale Price 
Maintenance: in Defence of Structuring the Rule of Reason’ (2012) 8 European 
Competition Journal 497, 501-502.  
124 Allianz Hungária supra n 1 para 36 
125 For example an indication that retailers forced manufactures to adopt such a policy or 
that the market is characterised by significant market power up or downstream. 
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for the Commission to engage in a more detailed contextual analysis.126 For 
example, if the Commission would engage only in a ‘pre-Allianz’ contextual 
analysis, then in theory, it should now be open for the parties to argue that 
the Commission failed to take into account the nature of the goods and the 
conditions of the functioning and structure of the market in question.127 In 
other words, the Allianz contextual approach could in theory tip the balance 
in favour of the parties in border-line object cases.  
Apart from bringing the European approach to minimum RPM more 
in line with the US approach, the Allianz Hungária quick effects analysis 
involves further advantages. It will reduce the risk of Type I errors (over 
enforcement), because it requires the Commission to examine in more detail 
the context, nature of the product and structure of the market before it can 
find an object restriction. 128  Moreover, the quick effects analysis also 
mitigates the problems that a full effects approach entails. A full effects 
approach to minimum RPM would require the competition authority to 
prove the inefficiency of minimum RPM and thereby increase regulatory 
costs129 and act as disincentive for private claimants.  
  
                                                
126 See Italianer supra n 96 5 stating that “apart from classic restrictions like price fixing, 
output limitations and sharing of markets and customers, there are other, more ambivalent 
situations, where a contextual analysis can either cast doubt on or confirm the 
anticompetitive object of an agreement”. 
127 Cf van Cleynenbreugel supra n 108 1419, 1421 who appears to advance a similar 
argument based on the concept of objective justifications, while questioning who should 
adduce  the necessary evidence in this regard.  
128 See in detail the examination above, supra n 85-114.  
129 For such criticism see F Van Doorn, ’Resale Price Maintenance in EC Competition Law: 
The Need for a Standardised Approach’ (November 6, 2009) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501070 accessed 25 July 2015 20. 
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G. Conclusion 
This article has discussed the impact of Allianz Hungária and its recent 
impact on the analysis in Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission 
in a bid to ascertain whether the CJ’s approach in these cases can be applied 
to minimum RPM. Allianz Hungária has been criticized for bringing within 
the object box130 potential competition law infringements that should be 
analyzed under the full effects test. Arguably, this would make it easier for 
the Commission to meet the burden of proof and classify more practices as 
object restrictions. On the contrary, we have submitted that Allianz Hungária 
may also have a positive side. It offers room for employing a ‘quick effects’ 
analysis. The ‘quick effects’ analysis could perform the opposite function for 
minimum RPM agreements. Thus, the contextual analysis suggested by 
Allianz Hungária could remove these agreements from the object into the 
effects category. If minimum RPM is subjected to a ‘quick effects’ analysis, 
then the European Commission, NCAs or private claimants will have to 
prove under 101(1) TFEU that the content and objective of the agreement is 
clearly anticompetitive. If that is not clear from the outset then they will 
have to additionally provide evidence on the legal and economic context of 
the agreement and show problematic nature or structure of the market,131 
without delving into a detailed effects analysis. Therefore, for a narrow 
category of competition law violations, such as minimum RPM, the ‘quick 
effects’ analysis might make it more difficult to prove and classify them as 
object restrictions. This appears to be in line with economic theory and 
narrows the gap between EU and US competition law regarding the analysis 
                                                
130 A term used very eloquently by Whish and Bailey, supra n 15 120-21. 
131 Eg a regulated/concentrated market or a case where significant market power exists. 
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of minimum RPM. The adopted approach does not ask for broadening the 
‘object’ category. On the contrary, it appears to suggest that certain 
competition law violations can be safely removed from the latter category in 
favour of incorporating some effects elements in their analysis. The ‘quick 
effects’ analysis is not a benchmark that should be applied to all object 
cases. It should be applied in cases where economic theory and current 
antitrust thinking question their anti-competitive effects.132  
 
 
                                                
132 For example, there may be room to test the ‘quick effects’ test’ analysis in cases 
involving pay for delay agreements between branded (originators) and generic drug 
manufacturers,  though this question involves complex issues of competition, regulation and 
patent policy that remain outside the scope of this article. Interestingly, the US Supreme 
Court subjected the relevant agreements under a rule of reason test, thereby adopting a 
middle ground test between the suggested FTC’s ‘quick look’ approach and the per se 
legality approach suggested by the minority opinion of Justice Scalia. See FTC v Actavis 
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). In Europe, see case COMP/ AT. 39226 – Lundbeck Commission 
Decision of 19 June 2013 (not yet published) and case COMP/AT. 39685 Fentanyl 
Commission decision of 10 December 2013 (not yet published). 
